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Solomonoff sequence prediction is a scheme to predict digits of binary
strings without knowing the underlying probability distribution. We call a
prediction scheme informed when it knows the true probability distribution
of the sequence. Several new relations between universal Solomonoff sequence
prediction and informed prediction and general probabilistic prediction
schemes will be proved. Among others, they show that the number of errors
in Solomonoff prediction is finite for computable distributions, if finite in the
informed case. Deterministic variants will also be studied. The most interest-
ing result is that the deterministic variant of Solomonoff prediction is optimal
compared to any other probabilistic or deterministic prediction scheme apart
from additive square root corrections only. This makes it well suited even for
difficult prediction problems, where it does not suffice when the number of
errors is minimal to within some factor greater than one. Solomonoff ’s
original bound and the ones presented here complement each other in a use-
ful way.  2001 Academic Press
Key Words: induction; Solomonoff, Bayesian, deterministic prediction;
algorithmic probability, Kolmogorov complexity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Induction is the process of predicting the future from the past or, more precisely,
it is the process of finding rules in (past) data and using these rules to guess future
data. The induction principle has been subject to long philosophical controversies.
Highlights are Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations, Occams’ razor (sim-
plicity) principle and Bayes’ rule for conditional probabilities [2]. In 1964,
Solomonoff [8] elegantly unified all these aspects into one formal theory of induc-
tive inference. The theory allows the prediction of digits of binary sequences
without knowing their true probability distribution in contrast to what we call an
informed scheme, where the true distribution is known. A first error estimate was
also given by Solomonoff 14 years later in [9]. It states that the total mean squared
distance of the prediction probabilities of Solomonoff and informed prediction is
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bounded by the Kolmogorov complexity of the true distribution. As a corollary,
this theorem ensures that Solomonoff prediction converges to informed prediction
for computable sequences in the limit. This is the key result which justifies the use
of Solomonoff prediction for long sequences of low complexity.
Another natural question is to ask for relations between the total number of
expected errors E! in Solomonoff prediction and the total number of prediction
errors E+ in the informed scheme. Unfortunately [9] does not bound E! in terms
of E+ in a satisfactory way. For example, it does not exclude the possibility of an
infinite E! even if E+ is finite. Here we want to prove upper bounds to E! in terms
of E+ ensuring as a corollary that the above case cannot happen. On the other
hand, our theorem does not say much about the convergence of Solomonoff to
informed prediction. So Solomonoff ’s and our bounds complement each other in a
nice way.
In the preliminary Section 2 we give some notations for strings and conditional
probability distributions on strings. Furthermore, we introduce Kolmogorov com-
plexity and the universal probability, where we take care to make the latter a true
probability measure.
In Section 3 we define the general probabilistic prediction scheme (\) and
Solomonoff (!) and informed ( +) prediction as special cases. We will give several
error relations between these prediction schemes. A bound for the error difference
|E!&E+ | between Solomonoff and informed prediction is the central result. All
other relations are then simple but interesting consequences or known results such
as the Euclidean bound.
In Section 4 we study deterministic variants of Solomonoff (3!) and informed
(3+) prediction. We will give similar error relations as in the probabilistic case
between these prediction schemes. The most interesting consequence is that the 3!
system is optimal compared to any other probabilistic or deterministic prediction
scheme apart from additive square root corrections only.
In the appendices A, B, and C we prove the inequalities (18), (20), and (26),
which are the central parts for the proofs of the Theorems 1 and 2.
For an excellent introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induc-
tion one should consult the book of Li and Vita nyi [7] or the article [6] for a
short course. Historical surveys of inductive inference can be found in [1, 10].
2. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper we will consider binary sequences (strings) and condi-
tional probability measures on strings.
We will denote strings over the binary alphabet [0, 1] by s=x1x2 . . .xn with
xk # [0, 1] and their lengths with l(s)=n. = is the empty string, xn : m :=
xn xn+1 . . .xm&1 xm for nm and = for n>m. Furthermore, x<n :=x1 . . .xn&1 .
We use Greek letters for probability measures and underline their arguments to
indicate that they are probability arguments. Let \n(x1 . . .xn ) be the probability that
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an (infinite) sequence starts with x1 . . .xn . We drop the index on \ if it is clear from
its arguments:
:
xn # [0, 1]
\(x1 : n )=:
xn
\n(x1 : n )=\n&1(x<n )=\(x<n ), \(=)=\0(=)=1. (1)
We also need conditional probabilities derived from Bayes’ rule. We prefer a
notation which preserves the order of the words in contrast to the standard
notation \( } | } ) which flips it. We extend the definition of \ to the conditional case
with the following convention for its arguments: An underlined argument xk is a
probability variable and other non-underlined arguments xk represent conditions.
With this convention, Bayes’ rule has the following look:
\(x<nx n
)=\(x
 1 : n
)\(x
 <n
) and
(2)
\(x1 . . .xn )=\(x 1
) } \(x1 x 2
) } . . . } \(x1 . . .xn&1x n
).
The first equation states that the probability that a string x1 . . .xn&1 is followed by
xn is equal to the probability that a string starts with x1 . . .xn divided by the prob-
ability that a string starts with x1 . . .xn&1 . The second equation is the first, applied
n times.
Let us choose some universal monotone Turing machine U with unidirectional
input and output tapes and a bidirectional work tape. We can then define the prefix
Kolmogorov complexity [3, 5] as the length of the shortest program p, for which
U outputs string s:
K(s) :=min
p
[l( p) : U( p)=s]. (3)
The universal semimeasure M(s) is defined as the probability that the output of the
universal Turing machine U starts with s when provided with fair coin flips on the
input tape. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the formal definition
M(s) := :
p : _| : U( p)=s|
2&l( p), (4)
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting
with s. U might be nonterminating. M has the important universality property [12]
that it majorizes every computable probability measure \ up to a multiplicative
factor depending only on \ but not on s:
\(s

)2K(\)+O(1)M(s). (5)
The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like \ is defined as the length of the
shortest self-delimiting coding of a Turing machine computing this function. Unfor-
tunately M itself is not a probability measure on the binary strings. We have
M(s0)+M(s1)<M(s) because there are programs p which output just s, followed
neither by 0 nor by 1; they just stop after printing s or continue forever without any
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further output. This drawback can easily be corrected1 [9]. Let us define the
universal probability measure ! by defining first the conditional probabilities
!(sx

) :=
M(sx)
M(s0)+M(s1)
, x # [0, 1], !(=) :=1 (6)
and then by using (2) to get !(x1 . . .xn ). It is easily verified by induction that ! is
indeed a probability measures and universal
\(s

)2K(\)+O(1)!(s

). (7)
The latter follows from !(s

)M(s) and (5). The universality property (7) is all we
need to know about ! in the following.
3. PROBABILISTIC SEQUENCE PREDICTION
Every inductive inference problem can be brought into the following form: Given
a string x, give a guess for its continuation y. We will assume that the strings which
have to be continued are drawn according to a probability distribution2. In this
section we consider probabilistic predictors of the next bit of a string. So let
+(x1 . . .xn ) be the true probability measure of string x1 : n , xk # [0, 1] and \(x<nx n
)
be the probability that the system predicts xn as the successor of x1 . . .xn&1 . We are
not interested here in the probability of the next bit itself. We want our system to
output either 0 or 1. Probabilistic strategies are useful in game theory where they
are called mixed strategies. We keep + fixed and compare different \. Interesting
quantities are the probability of making an error when predicting xn , given x<n . If
xn=0, the probability of our system to predict 1 (making an error) is \(x<n1
)=
1&\(x<n0
). That xn is 0 happens with probability +(x<n0
). Analogously for 0 W 1.
So the probability of making a wrong prediction in the nth step (x<n fixed) is
en\(x<n) := :
xn # [0, 1]
+(x<n x n
)[1&\(x<n x n
)]. (8)
The total +-expected number of errors in the first n predictions is
En\ := :
n
k=1
:
x1 . . .xk&1
+(x
 <k
) } ek\(x<k). (9)
If + is known, a natural choice for \ is \=+. This is what we call an informed
prediction scheme. If the probability of xn is high (low), the system predicts xn with
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1 Another popular way is to keep M and sacrifice some of the axioms of probability theory. The
reason for doing this is that M, although not computable [7, 9], is at least enumerable. On the other
hand, we are interested in conditional probabilities, derived from M, which are no longer enumerable
anyway, so there is no reason for us to stick to M. ! is still computable in the limit or approximable.
2 This probability measure + might be 1 for some sequence x1 :  and 0 for all others. In this case,
K(+n) is equal to K(x1 : n) (up to terms of order 1).
high (low) probability. If + is unknown, one could try the universal distribution !
for \ as defined in (4) and (6). This is known as a Solomonoff prediction [8].
What we are most interested in is an upper bound for the +-expected number of
errors En! of the !-predictor. One might also be interested in the probability
difference of predictions at step n of the +- and !-predictor or the total absolute
difference to some power : (:-norm in n-space).
d :k(x<k) :=:
xk
+(x<kx k
) } |!(x<k x k
)&+(x<kx k
)|:=|!(x<k0
)&+(x<k0
)|:
(10)
2 (:)n := :
n
k=1
:
x<k
+(x
 <k
) } d :k(x<k), :=1, 2
For :=2 there is the well-known result [9]
2 (2)n <
1
2 ln 2 } K(+)< for computable +. (11)
One reason to directly study relations between En! and En+ is that from (3.4) alone
it does not follow that E! is finite, if E+ is finite. Assume that we could choose
+ such that en+ t1n2 and en! t1n. Then E+ would be finite, but E! would be
infinite, without violating (11). There are other theorems, the most prominent being
!(x<nx n
)+(x<nx n
) ww
n  
1 with + probability 1 (see [7, p. 332]). However,
neither of them settles the above question. In the following we will show that a
finite E+ causes a finite E! .
Let us define the Kullback Leibler distance [4] or relative entropy between +
and !:
hn(x<n) :=:
xn
+(x<nx n
) ln
+(x<n x n
)
!(x<n x n
)
. (12)
Hn is then defined as the sum-expectation for which the following can be shown [9]
Hn := :
n
k=1
:
x<k
+(x
 <k
) } hk(x<k)= :
n
k=1
:
x1 : k
+(x
 1 : k
) ln
+(x<kx k
)
!(x<kx k
)
= :
x1 : n
+(x
 1 : n
) ln ‘
n
k=1
+(x<k x k
)
!(x<kx k
)
= :
x1 : n
+(x
 1 : n
) ln
+(x
 1 : n
)
!(x
 1 : n
)
<ln 2 } K(+n)+O(1). (13)
In the first line we have inserted (12) and used Bayes’ rule +(x
 <k
) } +(x<k x k
)=
+(x
 1 : k
). Due to (2.1) we can replace x1 : k +(x1 : k) by x1 : n +(x 1 : n
) as the
argument of the logarithm is independent of xk+1 : n . The k sum can now be
exchanged with the x1 : n sum and transforms to a product inside the logarithm. In
the last equality we have used the second form of Bayes’ rule (2) for + and !. If we
use universality (7) of !, i.e., ln +(x
 1 : n
)!(x
 1 : n
)<ln 2 } K(+n)+O(1), the final
inequality in (13) is yielded, which is the basis of all error estimates.
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We now come to our first theorem:
Theorem 1. Let there be binary sequences x1x2 . . . drawn with probability
+n(x 1 : n
) for the first n bits. A \-system predicts by definition xn from x<n with
probability \(x<nx n
). en\(x<n) is the error probability in the nth prediction (8) and
En\ is the +-expected total number of errors in the first n predictions (9). The follow-
ing error relations hold between universal Solomonoff (\=!), informed (\=+), and
general (\) predictions,
(i) |En!&En+ |2 (1)n <Hn+- 2En+Hn
(ii) 2(2)n 
1
2Hn
(iii) En!>2(2)n +
1
2En+
(iv) En!>En++Hn&- 2En+Hn >Hn for En+>2Hn
(v) En+2En\ , en+ 2en\ for any \
(vi) En!<2En\+Hn+- 4En\Hn for any \,
where Hn<ln 2 } K(+)+O(1) is the relative entropy (13) and K(+) is the Kolmogorov
complexity of + (3).
Corollary 1. For computable +, i.e., for K(+)<, the following statements
immediately follow from Theorem 1:
(vii) if E+ is finite, then E! is finite
(viii) En! En+=1+O(E &12n+ ) ww
En+   1
(ix) En!&En+=O(- En+ )
(x) En! En\2+O(E &12n\ ).
Relation (i) is the central new result. It is best illustrated for computable + by the
corollary. Statements (vii), (viii), and (ix) follow directly from (i) and the finiteness
of H . Statement (x) follows from (vi).
First of all, (vii) ensures finiteness of the number of errors of Solomonoff predic-
tion, if the informed prediction makes only a finite number of errors. This is espe-
cially the case for deterministic +, as En+=0 in this case3. Solomonoff prediction
makes only a finite number of errors on computable sequences. For more com-
plicated probabilistic environments, where even the ideal informed system makes an
infinite number of errors, (ix) ensures that the error excess of Solomonoff
prediction is only of order - En+ . This ensures that the error densities En n of both
systems converge to each other, but (ix) actually says more than this. It ensures
that the quotient converges to 1 and also gives the speed of convergence (viii).
Relation (ii) is the well-known Euclidean bound [9]. It is the only upper bound
in Theorem 1 which remains finite for En+\  . It ensures convergence of the
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3 We call a probability measure deterministic if it is 1 for exactly one sequence and 0 for all others.
individual prediction probabilities !(x<nx n
)  +(x<nx n
). Relation (iii) shows that
the ! system makes at least half of the errors of the + system. Relation (iv) improves
the lower bounds of (i) and (iii). Together with the upper bound in (i) it says that
the excess of ! errors as compared to + errors is given by Hn apart from
O(- En+Hn ) corrections. The excess is neither smaller nor larger. This result is
plausible, since knowing + means additional information, which saves making some
of the errors. The information content of + (relative to !) is quantified in terms of
the relative entropy Hn .
Relation (v) states that no prediction scheme can have less than half of the errors
of the + system, whatever we take for \. This ensures the optimality of + apart from
a factor of 2. Combining this with (i) ensures optimality of Solomonoff prediction,
apart from a factor of 2 and additive (inverse) square root corrections (vi), (x).
Note that even when comparing ! with \, the computability of + is what counts,
whereas \ might be any, even an uncomputable, probabilistic predictor. The
optimality within a factor of 2 might be sufficient for some applications, especially
for finite E+ or if En+ n  0, but is inacceptable for others. More about this in the
next section, where we consider deterministic prediction, where no factor 2 occurs.
Proof of Theorem 1. The first inequality in (i) follows directly from the defini-
tion of En and 2n and the triangle inequality. For the second inequality, let us start
more modestly and try to find constants A and B which satisfy the linear inequality
2 (1)n <A } En++B } Hn , (14)
If we could show
dk(x<k)<A } ek+(x<k)+B } hk(x<k) (15)
for all kn and all x<k , (14) would follow immediately by summation and the
definition of 2n , En , and Hn . With k, x<k , +, ! fixed now, we abbreviate
y :=+(x<k1
), 1& y=+(x<k0
)
z :=!(x<k1
), 1&z=!(x<k0
) (16)
r :=\(x<k1
), 1&r=\(x<k0
).
The various error functions can then be expressed by y, z, and r:
ek+=2y(1& y)
ek!=y(1&z)+(1& y) z
ek\=y(1&r)+(1& y) r (17)
dk=| y&z|
hk=y ln
y
z
+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z
.
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Inserting this into (3.8) we get
| y&z|<A } 2y(1& y)+B } _ y ln yz+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z& . (18)
In Appendix A we will show that this inequality is true for B 12A+1, A>0.
Inequality (3.7) therefore holds for any A>0, provided we insert B= 12A+1. Thus
we might minimize the r.h.s of (3.7) w.r.t A. The minimum is at A=- Hn 2En+
leading to the upper bound
2 (1)n <Hn+- 2En+ Hn
which completes the proof of (i).
Relation (ii) is well known [9]. It is already linear and is proved by showing
d 2n
1
2hn . Inserting the abbreviations (17) we get
2( y&z)2y ln
y
z
+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z
. (19)
This lower bound for the Kullback Leibler distance is well known [4].
Relation (iii) does not involve Hn at all and is elementary. It is reduced to en!>
d 2n+
1
2en+ , equivalent to z(1& y)+ y(1&z)>( y&z)
2+ y(1& y), equivalent to
z(1&z)>0, which is obviously true.
The second inequality of (iv) is trivial and, the first is proved similarly to (i).
Again we start with a linear inequality &En!<(A&1) En++(B&1) Hn , which is
further reduced to &ek!<(A&1) ek++(B&1) hk . Inserting the abbreviations (17)
we get
& y(1&z)&z(1& y)<(A&1) 2y(1& y)+(B&1) _ y ln yz+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z& .
(20)
In Appendix B this inequality is shown to hold for 2AB1, when B>1. If we
insert B=12A and minimize w.r.t. A, the minimum is again at A=- Hn 2En+
leading to the upper bound &En!&En+&Hn+- 2En+Hn restricted to En+>
2Hn , which completes the proof of (iv).
Statement (v) is satisfied because 2y(1& y)2[ y(1&r)+(1& y) r]. Statement
(vi) is a direct consequence of (i) and (v). This completes the proof of Theorem 1. K
4. DETERMINISTIC SEQUENCE PREDICTION
In the Section 3 several relations were derived between the number of errors of
the universal !-system, the informed +-system, and arbitrary \-systems. All of them
were probabilistic predictors in the sense that given x<n they output 0 or 1 with
certain probabilities. In this section, we are interested in systems whose output on
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input x<n is deterministically 0 or 1. Again we can distinguish between the case
where the true distribution + is known or unknown. In the probabilistic scheme we
studied the + and the ! system. Given any probabilistic predictor \ it is easy to con-
struct a deterministic predictor 3\ from it in the following way: If the probability
of predicting 0 is larger than 12 , the deterministic predictor always chooses 0.
Analogously for 0 W 1. We define4
3\(x<nx n
) :=3(\(x<nx n
)& 12) :={01
for \(x<nx n
)< 12
for \(x<nx n
)> 12 .
Note that every deterministic predictor can be written in the form 3\ for some \
and that although 3\(x1 . . .xn ), defined via Bayes’ rule (2), takes only values in
[0, 1], it may still be interpreted as a probability measure. Deterministic prediction
is just a special case of probabilistic prediction. The two models 3+ and 3! will be
studied now.
Analogously to the last section we draw binary strings randomly with distribu-
tion + and define the probability that the 3\ system makes an erroneous prediction
in the n th step and the total +-expected number of errors in the first n predictions
as
en3\(x<n) :=:
xn
+(x<nx n
)[1&3\(x<nx n
)]
(21)
En3\ := :
n
k=1
:
x<k
+(x
 <k
) } ek3\(x<k).
The definitions (12) and (13) of hn and Hn remain unchanged (! is not replaced by 3!).
The following relations will be derived:
Theorem 2. Let there be binary sequences drawn with probability +n(x 1 : n
) for
the first n bits. A \-system predicts by definition xn from x<n with probability
\(x<nx n
). A deterministic system 3\ always predicts 1, if \(x<nx n
)> 12 and 0
otherwise. If en\(x<n) is the error probability in the nth prediction, En\ the total
+-expected number of errors in the first n predictions (9), the following relations hold,
(i) 0En3!&En3+ =:
xk
+(x
 <k
) |en3!&en3+ |<Hn+- 4En3+ Hn+H
2
n
(ii) En3+En\ , en3+en\ for any \
(iii) En3! <En\+Hn+- 4En\Hn+H
2
n for any \
where Hn<ln 2 } K(+)+O(1) is the relative entropy (13), which is finite for
computable +.
No other useful bounds have been found, especially no bounds for the analogue
of 2n .
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4 All results will be independent of the choice for \= 12 , so one might choose 0 for definiteness.
Corollary 2. For computable +, i.e., for K(+)<, the following statements
immediately follow from Theorem 2:
(vii) if E3+ is finite, then E3! is finite
(viii) En3! En3+=1+O(E
&12
n3+
)  1 for En3+  
(ix) En3!&En3+=O(- En3+ )
(x) En3! En\1+O(E
&12
n\ ).
Most of what we said in the probabilistic case remains valid here, as the
theorems and corollaries 1 and 2 parallel each other. For this reason we will only
highlight the differences.
The last inequality of (i) is the central new result in the deterministic case. Again,
it is illustrated in the corollary, which follows trivially from Theorem 2.
From (ii) we see that 3+ is the best prediction scheme possible, compared to any
other probabilistic or deterministic prediction \. The error expectation en3+ is
smaller in every single step and hence the total number of errors are also. This itself
is not surprising and nearly obvious, as the 3+ system always predicts the bit of
highest probability. So, for known +, the 3+ system should always be preferred to
any other prediction scheme, even to the informed + prediction system.
Combining (i) and (ii) leads to a bound (iii) on the number of prediction errors
of the deterministic variant of Solomonoff prediction. For computable +, no
prediction scheme can have fewer errors than that of the 3! system, whatever we
take for \, apart from some additive correction of order - En3+ . No factor 2 occurs
as in the probabilistic case. Together with the quick convergence E &12n\ stated in
(x), the 3! model should be sufficiently good in many applications.
Example. Let us consider a critical example. We want to predict the outcome
of a die colored black (=0) and white (=1). Two faces should be white and the
other 4 should be black. The game becomes more interesting by having a second
complementary die with two black and four white sides. The dealer who throws the
dice uses one or the other die according to some deterministic rule. The stake s is
83 in every round; our return r is 85 for every correct prediction.
The coloring of the dice and the selection strategy of the dealer unambiguously
determine +. +(x<n0
) is 23 for die 1 or
1
3 for die 2. If we use \ for prediction, we will
have made En\ incorrect and n&En\ correct predictions in the first n rounds. The
expected profit will be
Pn\ :=(n&En\) r&ns=(2n&5En\) 8. (22)
The winning threshold Pn\>0 is reached if En\n<1&sr= 25 .
If we knew +, we could use the best possible prediction scheme 3+ . The error
(21) and profit (22) expectations per round in this case are
e3+ :=en3+(x<n)=
1
3
=
En3+
n
<
2
5
,
Pn3+
n
=
1
3
8>0 (23)
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so we can make money from this game. If we predict according to the probabilistic
+ prediction scheme (8) we would lose money in the long run:
en+(x<n)=2 }
1
3
}
2
3
=
4
9
=
En+
n
>
2
5
,
Pn+
n
=&
2
9
8<0
In the more interesting case where we do not know + we can use Solomonoff
prediction ! or its deterministic variant 3! . From (viii) of Corollaries 1 and 2 we
know that
Pn! Pn+ =1+O(n&12)=Pn3! Pn3+ ,
so asymptotically the ! system provides the same profit as the + system and the 3!
system the same as the 3+ system. Using the ! system is a losing strategy white
using the 3! system is a winning strategy. Let us estimate the number of rounds we
have to play before reaching the winning zone with the 3! system. Pn3!>0 if
En3!<(1&sr) n if
En3++Hn+- 4En3+ Hn+H
2
n <(1&sr) } n
by Theorem 2(i). Solving w.r.t. Hn we get
Hn <
(1&sr&En3+ n)
2
2 } (1&sr+En3+ n)
} n.
Using Hn<ln 2 } K(+)+O(1) and (23) we expect to be in the winning zone for
n>
2 } (1&sr+e3+)
(1&sr&e3+)
2 } ln 2 } K(+)+O(1)=330 ln 2 } K(+)+O(1)
If the die selection strategy reflected in + is not too complicated, the 3! prediction
system reaches the winning zone after a few thousand rounds. The number of
rounds is not really small because the expected profit per round is one order of
magnitude smaller than the return. This leads to a constant of two orders of
magnitude size in front of K(+). Stated otherwise, it is due to the large stochastic
noise, which makes it difficult to extract the signal, i.e., the structure of the rule +.
Furthermore, this is only a bound for the turnaround value of n. The true expected
turnaround n might be smaller.
However, every game for which there exists a winning strategy \ with Pn\ tn, 3!
is guaranteed to get into the winning zone for some ntK(+), i.e., Pn3!>0 for
sufficiently large n. This is not guaranteed for the !-system, due to the factor 2 in
the bound (x) of Corollary 1.
663SOLOMONOFF PREDICTION
Proof of Theorem 2. The method of proof is the same as in the previous section,
so we will keep it short. With the abbreviations (16) we can write ek3! and ek3+ in
the form
ek3!=y(1&3(z&
1
2))+(1& y) 3(z&
1
2)=| y&3(z&
1
2)|
(24)
ek3+=y(1&3( y&
1
2))+(1& y) 3( y&
1
2)=min[ y, 1& y].
With these abbreviations, (ii) is equivalent to min[ y, 1& y] y(1&r)+(1& y) r,
which is true, because the minimum of two numbers is always smaller than their
weighted average.
The first inequality and equality of (i) follow directly from (ii). To prove the last
inequality, we start once again with a linear model
En3! <(A+1) En3++(B+1) Hn . (25)
Inserting the definition of En and Hn , using (24), and omitting the sums we have
to find A and B, which satisfy
}y&3 \z& 12+}<(A+1) min[ y, 1& y]+(B+1) _ y ln
y
z
+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z& .
(26)
In Appendix C we will show that the inequality is satisfied for B 14A+
1
A and
A>0. Inserting B= 14A+
1
A into (25) and minimizing the r.h.s. w.r.t. A, we get the
upper bound
En3! <En3++Hn+- 4En+Hn+H
2
n for A
2=
Hn
En3++
1
4Hn
.
Statement (iii) is a direct consequence of (i) and (ii). This completes the proof of
Theorem 2. K
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have proved several new error bounds for Solomonoff prediction in terms of
informed prediction and in terms of general prediction schemes. Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 summarize the results in the probabilistic case and Theorem 2 and
Corollary 2 for the deterministic case. We have shown that in the probabilistic case
En! is asymptotically bounded by twice the number of errors of any other predic-
tion scheme. In the deterministic variant of Solomonoff prediction this factor 2 is
absent. It is well suited, even for difficult prediction problems, as the error probabil-
ity E3! n converges rapidly to that of the minimal possible error probability E3+ n.
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APPENDIXES
A. Proof of Inequality (18)
5With the definition
f ( y, z; A, B) :=A } 2y(1& y)+B } _ y ln yz+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z&&| y&z|
we have to show f ( y, z; A, B)>0 for 0< y<1, 0<z<1 and suitable A and B. We
do this by showing that f>0 at all extremal values, at boundaries, and at
nonanalytical points. f  + for z  01, if we choose B>0. Moreover, at the
nonanalytic point z= y we have f ( y, y; A, B)=2Ay(1& y)0 for A0. The
extremal condition fz=0 for z{ y (keeping y fixed) leads to
y=y* :=z } _1& sB (1&z)& , s :=sign(z& y)=\1.
Inserting y* into the definition of f and omitting the positive term B[ . . . ], we get
f ( y*, z; A, B)>2Ay*(1& y*)&|z& y*|=
1
B2
z(1&z) } g(z; A, B)
g(z; A, B) :=2A(B&s(1&z))(B+sz)&sB.
We have reduced the problem to showing g0. Since s=\1, we have g(z; A, B)>
2A(B&1+z)(B&z)&B for B>1. The latter is quadratic in z and symmetric in
z W 1&z with a maximum at 12 . Thus it is sufficient to check the boundary values
g(0; A, B)= g(1; A, B)=2A(B&1) B&B. They are non-negative for 2A(B&1)1.
Putting everything together, we have proved that f>0 for B 12A+1 and A>0. K
B. Proof of Inequality (20)
The proof of this inequality is similar to the previous one. With the definition
f ( y, z; A, B) :=(A&1) 2y(1& y)+(B&1) _ y ln yz+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z&
+ y(1&z)+z(1& y)
we have to show f ( y, z; A, B)>0 for 0< y<1, 0<z<1 and suitable A and B.
Again, we do this by showing that f>0 at all extremal values and at the boundary.
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5 The proofs are a bit sketchy. We will be a little sloppy about boundary values y=01, z= 12 , 3(0),
 versus >, and approaching versus at the boundary. All subtleties have been checked and do not spoil
the results. As 0<!<1, therefore 0<z<1 is strict.
f  + for z  0, 1, if we choose B>1. The extremal condition fz=0 (keeping
y fixed) leads to
y=y* :=z }
z&B
1&B&2z(1&z)
, 0< y*<1.
Inserting y* into the definition of f and omitting the positive term (B&1)[ . . . ], we
get
f ( y*, z; A, B)>2Ay*(1& y*)&(2y*&1)(z& y*)
=
z(1&z)
[1&B&2z(1&z)]2
} g(z; A, B)
g(z; A, B) :=2A(z&B)(1&z&B)&(B&1)(2z&1)2.
We have reduced the problem to showing g0. This is easy, since g is quadratic
in z and symmetric in z W 1&z. The extremal value g( 12 ; A, B)=2A(B&
1
2)
2 is
positive for A>0. The boundary values g(0; A, B)=g(1; A, B)=(2AB&1)(B&1)
are 0 for 2AB1. Putting everything together, we have proved that f>0 for
2AB1 and B>1. K
C. Proof of Inequality (26)
We want to show that
}y&3 \z& 12+}<(A+1) min[ y, 1& y]+(B+1) _ y ln
y
z
+(1& y) ln
1& y
1&z& .
The formula is symmetric w.r.t. y W 1& y and z W 1&z simultaneously, so we can
restrict ourselves to 0< y<1 and 0<z< 12 . Furthermore, let B>&1. Using (19),
it is enough to prove
f ( y, z; A, B) :=(A+1) min[ y, 1& y]+(B+1) 2( y&z)2& y>0.
f is quadratic in z, thus for y< 12 it takes its minimum at z= y. Since f ( y, y; A, B)
=Ay>0 for A>0, we can concentrate on the case y12. In this case, the
minimum is reached at the boundary z= 12 .
f ( y, 12 ; A, B)=(A+1)(1& y)+(B+1) 2( y&
1
2)
2& y
This is now quadratic in y with minimum at
y*=
A+2B+4
4(B+1)
, f \ y*, 12 ; A, B+=
4AB&A2&4
8(B+1)
0
for B 14A+
1
A , A>0, (OB1). K
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